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Kolektiva.social Security Alert
June 30, 2023: This is an alert for Kolektiva.social users. Please read this post in its entirety!
In mid-May 2023, the home of one of Kolektiva.social's admins was raided, and all their electronics were seized by the FBI. The raid was part of an investigation into a local protest. Kolektiva was neither a subject nor target of this investigation. Today, that admin was charged in relation to their alleged participation in this protest.
Unfortunately, at the time of the raid, our admin was troubleshooting an issue and working with a backup copy of the Kolektiva.social database. This backup, dated from the first week of May 2023, was in an *unencrypted* state when the raid occurred and it was seized, along with everything else.
The database is the heart of a Mastodon server. A database copy such as the one seized may include any of the following user data, in this case up to date as of early May 2023:
- User account information like the e-mail address associated with your account, your followers and follows, etc.
- All your posts: public, unlisted, followers-only, *and direct ("DMs")*.
- Possibly IP addresses associated with your account - IP addresses on Kolektiva.social are logged for 3 days and then deleted, so IP addresses from any logins in the 3 days prior to the database backup date would be included.
- A hashed ("encrypted") version of your password.
🚨 👉 As a precaution we highly recommend that all users on Kolektiva.social *change their password immediately* to a new, unique, and strong password.
We sincerely apologize to all our users and regret this breach. In hindsight, it was obviously a mistake to leave a copy of the database in an unencrypted state. Unfortunately, what would otherwise have been a small mistake happened to coincide with a raid, due to bad luck and spectacularly bad timing.
We understand that our users and other people on the Fediverse will have a lot of questions. We will try to answer them as best we can, but please be patient and bear in mind that we may be overwhelmed with messages, and may be delayed in responding or unable to provide answers to certain questions for legal or technical reasons. As a security culture reminder, it can be extremely harmful to the individuals charged and to our community to openly speculate on the Internet about alleged criminal activity or about what law enforcement may be able to do with seized data. Our present awareness is that the seized Kolektiva data is unrelated to the federal investigation and prosecution and we are exploring legal avenues to have the seized data returned and copies destroyed.
Thank you for your understanding and solidarity :black_sparkling_heart:
Unfortunately, at the time of the raid, our admin was troubleshooting an issue and working with a backup copy of the Kolektiva.social database. This backup, dated from the first week of May 2023, was in an *unencrypted* state when the raid occurred and it was seized, along with everything else.
The database is the heart of a Mastodon server. A database copy such as the one seized may include any of the following user data, in this case up to date as of early May 2023:
- User account information like the e-mail address associated with your account, your followers and follows, etc.
- All your posts: public, unlisted, followers-only, *and direct ("DMs")*.
- Possibly IP addresses associated with your account - IP addresses on Kolektiva.social are logged for 3 days and then deleted, so IP addresses from any logins in the 3 days prior to the database backup date would be included.
- A hashed ("encrypted") version of your password.
🚨 👉 As a precaution we highly recommend that all users on Kolektiva.social *change their password immediately* to a new, unique, and strong password.
We sincerely apologize to all our users and regret this breach. In hindsight, it was obviously a mistake to leave a copy of the database in an unencrypted state. Unfortunately, what would otherwise have been a small mistake happened to coincide with a raid, due to bad luck and spectacularly bad timing.
We understand that our users and other people on the Fediverse will have a lot of questions. We will try to answer them as best we can, but please be patient and bear in mind that we may be overwhelmed with messages, and may be delayed in responding or unable to provide answers to certain questions for legal or technical reasons. As a security culture reminder, it can be extremely harmful to the individuals charged and to our community to openly speculate on the Internet about alleged criminal activity or about what law enforcement may be able to do with seized data. Our present awareness is that the seized Kolektiva data is unrelated to the federal investigation and prosecution and we are exploring legal avenues to have the seized data returned and copies destroyed.
Thank you for your understanding and solidarity :black_sparkling_heart:
For more information:
https://kolektiva.social/@admin/1106370315...
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Why did we delay in notifying our users? After extensive internal discussions and advice from multiple movement lawyers, we made the difficult decision to delay informing our users, since an earlier public statement could have made the situation worse in a number of ways.
To be clear, the physical Kolektiva servers were not targeted or affected by the FBI raid. Our actual, live servers are encrypted, in that the hard drives are encrypted at rest. We have no reason to believe that any Kolektiva.social data has been compromised, outside of the database back-up that was seized. Our admin's various electronic devices and other drives were encrypted, and we swiftly rotated all passwords and keys as appropriate for any potential breach like this. In other words, we have no reason to believe this is an evolving threat to our server integrity, or our users' data security.
So then, why are we asking users to reset their passwords? The seized database did not contain user passwords, it contained hashed user passwords. To better understand why we recommend users change their password, here is a good explainer: https://www.troyhunt.com/we-didnt-encrypt-your-password-we-hashed-it-heres-what-that-means/
Without offering any excuses, we also think it warrants mentioning that the seized data would be similar to data obtained in any raid or other unauthorized access of any typical Mastodon server. It is the same data any cooperating instance admin can hand over willingly when requested. Unfortunately, there are serious limits to what admins of Mastodon instances can do to protect the data of their users. Users should always take precautions to protect the privacy of information, especially any sensitive information, they share on the Fediverse or anywhere else on the Internet. We hope that if nothing else, this situation serves as a learning experience for our users, and others on the Fediverse. It certainly has for us. For an intro to operational security on Mastodon, we strongly recommend checking out this guide: https://distro.f-91w.club/masto-opsec/
Going forward, we will continue to explore our legal options. Ideally, we would be presenting a comprehensive list of internal changes, policies and best practices that we plan to implement to avoid outcomes like this in the future. These are definitely conversations we have started having, and intend to continue, but we also want people to be aware that we're a small volunteer collective, and we are dramatically affected by these events. Things may be slow to develop. We also have to keep Kolektiva.social running and pick up the slack now that we are missing a crucial team member 💔 .
Our admin's legal situation is shitty, but they currently have the support and legal representation they need. We will post any information or calls for support if that becomes appropriate or needed.
As many understand, our political movements are currently facing high levels of state repression, which has resulted in an increase in digital and other forms of surveillance, raids and arrests, false and overblown criminal charges, increased use of pre-trial detention and lengthy prison sentences. At times like these, political movements are tested and solidarity and security culture become important touchstones for our work to make the world a better place for all.
Thank you again for your understanding, solidarity, and time taken to read all this.
To be clear, the physical Kolektiva servers were not targeted or affected by the FBI raid. Our actual, live servers are encrypted, in that the hard drives are encrypted at rest. We have no reason to believe that any Kolektiva.social data has been compromised, outside of the database back-up that was seized. Our admin's various electronic devices and other drives were encrypted, and we swiftly rotated all passwords and keys as appropriate for any potential breach like this. In other words, we have no reason to believe this is an evolving threat to our server integrity, or our users' data security.
So then, why are we asking users to reset their passwords? The seized database did not contain user passwords, it contained hashed user passwords. To better understand why we recommend users change their password, here is a good explainer: https://www.troyhunt.com/we-didnt-encrypt-your-password-we-hashed-it-heres-what-that-means/
Without offering any excuses, we also think it warrants mentioning that the seized data would be similar to data obtained in any raid or other unauthorized access of any typical Mastodon server. It is the same data any cooperating instance admin can hand over willingly when requested. Unfortunately, there are serious limits to what admins of Mastodon instances can do to protect the data of their users. Users should always take precautions to protect the privacy of information, especially any sensitive information, they share on the Fediverse or anywhere else on the Internet. We hope that if nothing else, this situation serves as a learning experience for our users, and others on the Fediverse. It certainly has for us. For an intro to operational security on Mastodon, we strongly recommend checking out this guide: https://distro.f-91w.club/masto-opsec/
Going forward, we will continue to explore our legal options. Ideally, we would be presenting a comprehensive list of internal changes, policies and best practices that we plan to implement to avoid outcomes like this in the future. These are definitely conversations we have started having, and intend to continue, but we also want people to be aware that we're a small volunteer collective, and we are dramatically affected by these events. Things may be slow to develop. We also have to keep Kolektiva.social running and pick up the slack now that we are missing a crucial team member 💔 .
Our admin's legal situation is shitty, but they currently have the support and legal representation they need. We will post any information or calls for support if that becomes appropriate or needed.
As many understand, our political movements are currently facing high levels of state repression, which has resulted in an increase in digital and other forms of surveillance, raids and arrests, false and overblown criminal charges, increased use of pre-trial detention and lengthy prison sentences. At times like these, political movements are tested and solidarity and security culture become important touchstones for our work to make the world a better place for all.
Thank you again for your understanding, solidarity, and time taken to read all this.
For more information:
https://kolektiva.social/@admin/1106370339...
Two additional points:
If you are a kolektiva.social user and have already enabled Two-factor Authentication on your account you should also reset that, just like your password. (Also consider that it's a good idea in general to set up Two-factor authentication, if you are able, to secure access to your account!)
------------------------------
Some users have asked or pointed out, and yes it is the case that the database copy would also include cached copies of posts from users on other instances in the Fediverse, and this includes direct posts or "DMs" which were sent to or included a Kolektiva.social user.
We welcome suggestions on how to most effectively notify (a lot) of Fediverse users in general of this, but we also ask for other instance admins to help by communicating this to their own users if it seems appropriate 🙏
------------------------------
Update: the RSA signing keys for every account on kolektiva.social have now been rotated.
If you are a kolektiva.social user and have already enabled Two-factor Authentication on your account you should also reset that, just like your password. (Also consider that it's a good idea in general to set up Two-factor authentication, if you are able, to secure access to your account!)
------------------------------
Some users have asked or pointed out, and yes it is the case that the database copy would also include cached copies of posts from users on other instances in the Fediverse, and this includes direct posts or "DMs" which were sent to or included a Kolektiva.social user.
We welcome suggestions on how to most effectively notify (a lot) of Fediverse users in general of this, but we also ask for other instance admins to help by communicating this to their own users if it seems appropriate 🙏
------------------------------
Update: the RSA signing keys for every account on kolektiva.social have now been rotated.
For more information:
https://kolektiva.social/@admin/1106517031...
Tell me that a server the FBI has handled,
from which they have extracted all user data is now safe to use.
We've been through 20 years of this bullshit. Try pulling my leg a little harder.
You allowed the FBI to have all your users' data for 2 months, then told them "it's okay now, just change your password"
Shortly before Mr. Admin's arrest, it was his priority to get Tor (the onion router) working on the Kolektiva site. I know how they had a cop parked outside counting the Tor packets while Jeremy Hammond was set up for his fall: it's in the indictment they sealed.
FBI loves Tor.
It really works for them.
I asked "any chance you could do something about getting search working?"
He replied, "I'm busy trying to get a Tor connection.
It wasn't long after that I was quickly banned for ridiculous bullshit.
Anyone who continues to play games with the laughing jackass who runs Kolektiva...
well go ahead, you deserve it.
Like a real honeypot, they have all the correct answers:
don't you dare doubt them, or you are a Nazi.
Well okay. Carry on.
David Roknich
INDYRADIO
"It belongs to us"
from which they have extracted all user data is now safe to use.
We've been through 20 years of this bullshit. Try pulling my leg a little harder.
You allowed the FBI to have all your users' data for 2 months, then told them "it's okay now, just change your password"
Shortly before Mr. Admin's arrest, it was his priority to get Tor (the onion router) working on the Kolektiva site. I know how they had a cop parked outside counting the Tor packets while Jeremy Hammond was set up for his fall: it's in the indictment they sealed.
FBI loves Tor.
It really works for them.
I asked "any chance you could do something about getting search working?"
He replied, "I'm busy trying to get a Tor connection.
It wasn't long after that I was quickly banned for ridiculous bullshit.
Anyone who continues to play games with the laughing jackass who runs Kolektiva...
well go ahead, you deserve it.
Like a real honeypot, they have all the correct answers:
don't you dare doubt them, or you are a Nazi.
Well okay. Carry on.
David Roknich
INDYRADIO
"It belongs to us"
For more information:
https://indyradio.net
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