



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS

HQ AFOSI/XILI
P.O. Box 2218
Waldorf, MD 20604-2218

American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California
Attention: Mark Schlosberg
39 Drumm Street, 2nd Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111

Dear Mr. Schlosberg

This is in response to your 31 January 2006 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)/Privacy Act request that you originally sent to the Department of the Air Force, 11CS/SCSR (FOIA) (which has been changed to HAF/ICIOD (FOIA)), requesting information on Threat and Local Observation Notices (TALONs), individuals, and organizations as indicated in your request, part II, paragraphs 1 through 9. The AF FOIA office faxed your request to us on 31 March 2006 and ask us to reply directly to you when documents were located. Please reference FOIA #8883 in all correspondence regarding this matter. This supplements our 19 April 2006 response to you.

On 4 April 2006, we forwarded your request to eight separate HQ AFOSI offices and asked them to conduct searches and return any responsive documents to us. All responsive documents were received by 10 April 2006 and were assigned to a release specialist on 25 April 2006 to begin to review the documents for our release.

Portions of the information requested are exempt from disclosure to you. We have inserted notations on the attached documents to identify the portions deleted and the reasons for doing this. The notations are explained as follows:

a. "b5" pertains to information, which concerns inter- or intra-agency memoranda exchanged between the components of this headquarters and other Federal agencies. Most of these items concern instructions provided to field units of this headquarters or memoranda they have prepared for Air Force files. Such items are not normally made available outside of AFOSI. They are used to direct and control investigative activity. The authority for this exemption may be found in the United States Code, Title 5, Section 552(b)(5).

b. "b6" indicates the withholding of information contained in personnel, medical, and similar files or information that applies to a particular individual for which we have determined there exists a privacy interest that generally and categorically outweighs any public interest in disclosure that the Freedom of Information Act would authorize. As recognized in federal statutes and case law, the type of information that this generally

requires to be withheld includes the names of government employees and law enforcement agents; personal data information such as Social Security Numbers, signatures, personal addresses (including email), and telephone numbers; medical and criminal history information; and most identifying information on persons forward deployed, overseas, or assigned to sensitive or routinely deployable units. The authority for this exemption may be found in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) and in the federal court cases interpreting that statute.

c. "b7C" indicates the withholding of information contained in law enforcement records, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. As recognized in federal statutes and case law, the type of information that this generally requires to be withheld includes the names of subjects, witnesses, and "non-confidential" informants of law enforcement investigations; the personal data or identifying information of any third party that is detailed within a law enforcement investigation; and the names of law enforcement personnel unless it is determined that there is a public interest in the release of a particular law enforcement individual's name with respect to a particular law enforcement investigation. The authority for this exemption may be found in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) and in the federal court cases interpreting that statute.

Should you decide that an appeal to this decision is necessary, you must write to the Secretary of the Air Force within 60 days from the date of this letter. Include in the appeal your reasons for reconsideration and attach a copy of this letter. Your letter and envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Address your letter as follows:

Secretary of the Air Force
Thru: HQ AFOSI/XILI
P.O. Box 2218
Waldorf, MD 20604-2218

Sincerely



ANNE C. COSTA
Chief, Information Release Branch

Attachment:
Cy of TALON related documents,
Less exemptions

From:
Sent: Tuesday, August 13, 2002 5:54 PM
To:
Cc:

Subject: TALON POLICY /INTERIM

Follow Up Flag: Read
Flag Status: Completed
Ladies & Gentlemen,

It's time now, though, to further refine our focus in ascertaining if an incident meets actual Talon criteria & to ensure we select the proper reporting vehicle. We must be careful not to collect, report and retain information that has no possible DoD threat connection....this is tough, but essential. We all know the war on terrorism does not start at the main gates of our installations. But we don't want the TALON process to be a "police blotter." Neither do we want to draw fouls by careless disregard of intel oversight rules.

As our Investigations, Collections, Operations Nexus (ICON) continues to mature, you'll receive more feedback, at all field levels, on your reporting efforts. Your feedback is important too...& your judgement is critical to the success of this process.

Keep up the superb work.

b6.b7c

b7, b7C



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE MD

23 Sep 02

MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

FROM: HQ AFOSI

b6, b7c

SUBJECT: Policy for Daily TALON Review

1. PURPOSE: TALON reporting has been in place since 22 Oct 01; however, these reports have not been reviewed specifically to ensure the field is appropriately following up with such actions as opening cases (information, developmental, or substantive), or publishing IIRs. This new policy places the responsibility on representatives from (Atch 1) to daily review the TALONS and, with the assistance of the suspense the field with the identified required actions.

2. BACKGROUND: Numerous TALON reports have been identified where no appropriate follow-up actions, such as opening a criminal or CI case or writing an IIR, had occurred. This problem has existed since the inception of the TALON reporting process and anecdotal evidence reflects there is a growing trend by agents in the field to use only the TALON system in lieu of standard AFOSI and DoD procedures. In response to this problem, representatives from met to develop a process for reviewing daily TALONS, identifying those which require a case or IIR, and ensuring the originating detachment takes appropriate action.

3. POLICY: Effective immediately, a new TALON Review Committee has been created, combining representatives from to review all TALONS daily. The following steps will be taken to identify TALONS that require further action:

- a. The Watch will e-mail daily TALON report summaries to each committee member (may also access them via the webpage).
- b. Each committee member will review every TALON and TALON ECHO received daily. The committee member will maintain a spreadsheet of all TALONS that require additional follow-up (i.e., meets IIR criteria or a case – developmental, informational, or substantive – needs to be opened). Once a TALON is identified needing to be documented in an IIR or a case opened, the committee member will wait 48-hours to see if a TALON ECHO is received from the originating detachment stating that a case/IIR has been opened. This allows the detachments and regions the standard 48-hours for initiation before they get any direction from the Watch.
- c. If, after 48 hours, the TALON has not resulted in the identified required action, the committee member, coordinating with their individual division chiefs as required, will send an e-mail to the Watch identifying the required follow-up action with a suspense (i.e., TALON 1-22-334-02 has criminal information that warrants opening a case type ##; Det ### should accomplish this action within 48 hours). A courtesy

copy of each email will be sent to the
their validation of the requirement.

for

- d. Upon receipt of either an email or verbal validation of the identified action from the _____, the Watch will email the detachment responsible for the TALON, with a courtesy copy to the original committee member and the Region TALON POC (Atch 1). This email will identify the action that needs to be taken, the TALON it is in response to, the time the detachment has in which to respond, and instructions to ensure their reply is sent in the form of a TALON ECHO back to all the addressees of the original tasking email. In addition, the email will conclude with: "This suspense was validated by <name of _____>, <position title>, <phone number>."
- e. The Watch will also be required to document all actions taken in the "Case Notes on TALON" section for each TALON and in the Issues Log for tracking purposes.
- f. Each committee member will be responsible for tracking which TALONS were tasked for follow-up and monitoring when a response is received.
- g. If the tasked detachment does not receive the required response by the suspense, the committee member will then coordinate with the Region TALON POC to facilitate the required response.
- h. Once the committee member receives a response (an IIR was written or a case was opened), he or she must coordinate with the Watch to ensure the information is loaded into the TALON database for tracking purposes.
- i. OVERSIGHT – The _____ will be responsible for oversight to ensure this policy is being followed.

4. This policy memo will remain in effect indefinitely. The OPR for this policy is

USAF

Attachment:

DISTRIBUTION:

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b6, b7C

TALON REVIEW COMMITTEE

XOG –	(primary);	(alternate)
XONP –	(primary);	(alternate)
XOQI –	(primary);	(alternate)

REGION POCs

Region 1 –
Alt. –

Region 2 –
Alt. –

Region 3 –
Alt. –

Region 4 –
Alt. –

Region 5 –
Alt. –

Region 6 –
Alt. –

Region 7 –
Alt. –

Region 8 –
Alt. –

b6b7c

From:
Sent: Tuesday, August 02, 2005 5:09 PM
To:
Cc:
Subject: TALON & Constitutionally Protected Activities

While planned lawful protest would not warrant a TALON report, most would warrant simple notification to the affected OSI and AF commanders -- and Watch. Lawful protest can result in crowds which congest traffic, impede entrance to installations and facilities, draw counter demonstrations, and even escalate into violence. Planning for crowd control, traffic control, alternate installation entrance & exit points, etc. is a prudent and important command activity.

Guidance on TALON reporting is contained in AFOSIMAN 71-121.

From:
Sent: Friday, August 27, 2004 5:55 AM
To:
Subject: TALON & Constitutionally Protected Activities

b6 b7c

TALON reporting was authorized by the Deputy Secretary of Defense as a means of capturing non-validated domestic threat information and incorporating it into the DoD terrorism threat warning process. The reporting categories established by Joint Staff Domestic Threat Working Group are as follows: (1) non-specific threats to DoD interests; (2) suspected surveillance of DoD facilities and personnel; (3) elicitation attempts, suspicious questioning, or other suspected intelligence collection activities focused on DoD interests; (4) tests of security; (5) unusual repetitive activity; (6) bomb threats; and (7) any other suspicious activity and incidents reasonably believed to be related to terrorist activity directed against DoD personnel, property, and activities within the United States.

b5, b6, b7C

TALON Reports & Constitutionally Protected Activities

A TALON is a raw law enforcement report concerning criminal or suspicious activity potentially threatening USAF/DoD interests, unlike an IIR that is a vehicle for reporting intelligence information responsive to collection requirements.

As TALON is law enforcement reporting, rather than intelligence collection, the applicable guidance is DoD Directive 5200.27 (<http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/520027.htm>), rather than DoD 5240.1-R (<http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/52401r.htm>). Information concerning persons and organizations not affiliated with DoD may be acquired only in limited circumstances. All TALON information about US citizens or any persons in the US, who are not affiliated with DoD, must fall under one of the categories in para 4.1 of DoD Directive 5200.27 before it can be gathered and reported.

Para 4.1 indicates information may be acquired about activities threatening defense military and civilian personnel and defense activities and installations, including vessels, aircraft, communications equipment, and supplies. Specific criteria includes the following types of activities (the more common occurrences are in bold):

- 4.1.1. Subversion of loyalty, discipline, or morale of DoD military or civilian personnel by actively encouraging violation of law, disobedience of lawful order or regulation, or disruption of military activities,
- 4.1.2. Theft of arms, ammunition, or equipment, or destruction or sabotage of facilities, equipment, or records belonging to DoD units or installations,
- 4.1.3. Acts jeopardizing the security of DoD elements or operations or compromising classified defense information by unauthorized disclosure or by espionage,
- 4.1.4. Unauthorized demonstrations on active or reserve DoD installations,
- 4.1.5. Direct threats to DoD military or civilian personnel in connection with their official duties or to other persons who have been authorized protection by DoD resources,
- 4.1.6. Activities endangering facilities which have classified defense contracts or which have been officially designated as key defense facilities, or
- 4.1.7. Crimes for which DoD has responsibility for investigating or prosecuting.

Specific threats, surveillance, elicitation, tests of security, or repetitive activities that may fall under one or more of these criteria may be reported via TALON.

However, we must be wary of simply collecting information about persons in the US just because they are exercising their First Amendment right to demonstrate, protest, or engage in anti-war speech. DoD Directive 5200.27 para 5.2 specifically prohibits the collection of information about a person or organization solely because of lawful advocacy of measures in opposition to government policy. Remember that gathering information about Vietnam protesters is exactly what led to the creation of DoD 5200.27, the Privacy Act, and the intelligence oversight rules.

Unless we can show these persons are doing something besides exercise their Constitutionally protected right to protest and that the activity meets the criteria in para 4.1 the information should not be retained. Retention of this information may also violate the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 USC 552a(e)(7), which has civil and criminal penalties.

Additionally, DoD Directive 5200.27, para 5.6 prohibits assigning DoD personnel to attend public or private meetings, demonstrations, or other similar activities for the purpose of acquiring information, even if this Directive authorizes the collection, without specific prior approval by the Secretary of Defense. An very limited exception to this policy can be made by the local commander concerned, or higher authority, when, in his judgment, the threat is direct and immediate and time precludes obtaining prior approval. However, in this event a report must be made immediately to the Secretary of Defense.

b6.b7C

-----Original Message-----

From:
Sent: Friday, October 19, 2001 7:04 PM
To:
Cc:

Subject: ACTION REQ'D - AFOSI CASE / TERRORISM I&W
Importance: High

ALCON

1. THIS EMAIL REQUIRES YOUR ATTENTION & ACTION. IT IS MANDATORY UPON RECEIPT AT EVERY COMMAND ECHELON.

2. OUR PROCESSES TO DEVELOP, ANALYZE, & REPORT THREAT INFORMATION ARE NO LONG ENTIRELY SERVICEABLE IN VIEW OF POST - 11 SEPT USAF & NATIONAL REQUIREMENTS. WE MUST TREMENDOUSLY INCREASE THE SPEED OF OUR REPORTING, DRAMATICALLY ENHANCE THE WAY WE SYNTHESIZE LAW ENFORCEMENT / COUNTERINTELL / RELEVANT DATA FROM THE MANY INTEL DISCIPLINES, & SWIFTLY DISSEMINATE ACTIONABLE REPORTING TO INSTALLATION CMDRS, AFOSI, SECURITY FORCES, & INTEL ELEMENTS. OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO GIVE CMDRS NEWS THEY CAN USE IN ASSESSING THE THREAT, POSTURING THEIR SECURITY FORCES & PREPARING THEIR DEFENSES. IN THIS VEIN, IT IS VITAL TO CUE THEM TO SUBSTANTIVE THREATS; IT IS EQUALLY AS IMPORTANT TO CUE THEM TO WHAT IS NOT A THREAT (E.G. RUMORS WE HAVE DISPELLED THRU OUR INQUIRIES).

3.

4. EFFECTIVELY IMMEDIATELY, THE "TALON" REPORTING VEHICLE IS ESTABLISHED. TALON REPORTING TIME REQUIREMENTS ARE NECESSARILY SHORT: ONE HR TO FOR INITIAL NOTICE TO INSTALLATION OFFICIALS, TWO HRS TO CASE, 24 HR REPORTING INCREMENTS UNTIL RESOLVED. SEE DETAILS IN ATTACHMENT. TO REITERATE, TALON REPORTS NEED NOT MEET A HIGH TEST FOR "CHECK LIST CRITERIA," AS MUCH AS A SPECIAL AGENT / INVESTIGATOR / LAW ENFORCEMENT "GUT CHECK" FOR CONCERN.

5.

From:
Sent: Wednesday, December 19, 2001 9:28 AM
To:
Subject: Clarification on TALONs - USE This One
Attachments: Clarification of TALON Guidance.doc

Pls use this guidance for the TALON closure issue. This went out to everyone when the data base went out. Bottom line is that a _ needs to make the recommendation on closure and we will accept that unless we need a follow-up action on the TALON. There may be logical reasons not to do anything else other than a TALON. Hope this helps and apologize for any confusion.



Clarification of
TALON Guidanc...

b1.b7c

Clarification of TALON Guidance

TALONs have been out for approximately a month now, and we have seen some areas where we need to provide some clarification and guidance. With the development of the TALON program it is imperative we get you this information to aid in transitioning to the new system.

TALON Sequence Numbers: A reminder that the sequence numbers are Unit Number–Two Digit Day–Two Digit Month–Two Digit Year–Sequence Number

Any “Echo” or follow-up will be an alpha sequence, using the exact same TALON Sequence Number as the original report.

TALON Status and Follow-up: There has been some debate on who may close a TALON. The original guidance indicated the CASE was the only one who could close a TALON. While technically correct, we never really defined the procedures.

Effective immediately, all TALON Status will be designated by the Detachment Commander or the Special Agent-in-Charge for the unit publishing the TALON. The status designated by the DETCO or SAIC will be taken as final unless changed by either the Region or the CASE.

Generally, most TALONs are a one time reporting issue, therefore, defaulting to the Detachment is the most expedient method.

On any follow-up TALON where there is a specific date for a follow-up, (for lab results, scheduled interview, etc) there is no need for 24 hour follow-ups, nor is there a requirement to receive correspondence from the CASE authorizing it. If there is a need for an earlier follow-up, the Region or the CASE will contact the Region and/or unit for necessary information.

Anthrax or Suspicious White Powdery Substance (WPS) TALONS: On all WPS or suspected “Anthrax” incidents, the CASE will require a “closure” TALON when the results are returned from the laboratory.

HQ AFOSI currently reports all suspected anthrax and WPS incidents to the Air Force Chief of Staff and there is a requirement to report all “pending” incidents where the substance was forwarded to a laboratory for further testing.

On all suspected anthrax or WPS incidents, if there will be no follow-up lab testing, close the TALON and indicate preliminary results and a definitive statement there will be no additional testing conducted. With this statement the TALON will be closed, and no follow-up required, unless new information is developed. Any incident where lab testing will be conducted, that information needs to be clear and a TALON is required to close the incident upon receipt of lab test results.

Reporting Requirements: The TALON guidance requires 2 hour notification on TALON reportable incidents. We are receiving many TALONs well outside these reporting times. The clear intent of the timelines to ensure a sense of urgency. We are not tracking timelines, leaving this as a Commander issue, however, we may require a short explanation on those well outside the timeliness.

TALON Disposition: Information reported in a TALON is raw data and will require a decision by the Detachment as to final disposition. In the original instructions it indicated the CASE would direct what action would be taken. The guidance should have reflected the DETCO or SAIC would make the recommendation and unless changed by the respective Region or the CASE, the detachment should press forward with the stated disposition in the TALON.

National Level Sharing of TALONs: The decision has been made to share TALONs with other services and the Joint Staff elements. Given that, we need to ensure the TALONs answer the basic questions concerning the incident, at the moment you send the TALON. Upon receipt of the TALON at the CASE, the CASE will have approximately five hours to develop the matter with follow-up, etc before the TALON is sent to the various services and the J-34.



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS

4 February 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR SAF/IG

FROM: HQ AFOSI/

SUBJECT: DoD Waiver Concerning Retention Guidelines in DODD 5200.27

1. AFOSI recognized the critical need for near real time reporting of threat indications near military installations. The terrorist planning cycle is a two to five year process. Law enforcement needs to get inside the terrorist planning cycle by collecting and analyzing information which is not always obvious and may require numerous unrelated incidents to take place prior to a pattern of targeting being realized. AFOSI undertook the TALON report to document incidents and coordinate with USAF, DoD and civilian law enforcement agencies.
2. DoD Directive 5200.27, allows law enforcement and security organizations to monitor criminal activity near DoD facilities and to legally accept and retain for up to 90 days information pertaining to persons and organizations not affiliated with DoD, which threaten DoD equities. Longer retention is permitted if required by law or permission is specifically granted by the Secretary of Defense or his designee.
3. We specifically request authorization for the following:

4. My point of contacts are _____ or _____

bs,

, USAF

b6, b7C

MEMORANDUM FOR ALLMAJCOM/CC

SUBJECT: Collection, Reporting, and Analysis of Terrorist Threats to DoD within The United States via TALON Reporting System

Since September 11th 2001, the DoD has come to realize that while the Department has an established process to identify, report, and analyze information regarding foreign terrorists threats, the Department had no formal mechanism to collect and share non-validated domestic threat information between intelligence, counterintelligence, law enforcement and force protection entities and subject that information to careful analysis for indications of foreign terrorist activity. To fill this gap, DEPSECDEF has instituted the Air Force's "TALON" report for use throughout DoD.

The TALON report, developed by the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), consists of raw information reported by concerned citizens and military members regarding suspicious incidents. Information in TALON reports is non-validated, may or may not be related to an actual threat, and by its very nature may be fragmented and incomplete. The purpose of the TALON is to document and immediately disseminate potential threat information to DoD personnel, facilities, and resources. The TALON mechanism is not designed to take the place of DoD's formal intelligence reporting process.

Within the Air Force, AFOSI will remain the lead agency with respect to collection, reporting and the appropriate distribution of TALON reports to both local military commanders and those responsible for installation security, as well as to the DoD Counterintelligence Field Activity.

Cc:

6667C

9 Jun 03

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL MAJCOM/CC

SUBJECT: Collection, Reporting, and Analysis of Terrorist Threats to DoD within the United States via TALON Reporting System

The events September 11th 2001, underscored that DoD and the Air Force needed a way to collect and share information about CONUS-based suspicious events between intelligence, counterintelligence, law enforcement and force protection entities so that information could be analyzed for indications of foreign terrorist activity. The Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) created an effective fix for this on 19 Oct 01 and, after thorough vetting and staffing, DEPSECDEF recently instituted the Air Force's "TALON" report for use DoD-wide.

The TALON report consists of untested and uncorroborated information about suspicious events reported by concerned citizens and service members, their family members, and others who form the "community of interests" surrounding our installations. The purpose of the TALON is to document and immediately disseminate potential threat information to DoD commanders and force protection authorities, albeit with the understanding that it is fragmentary and incomplete. TALON reporting is not designed to take the place of DoD's formal intelligence reporting process.

Within the Air Force, AFOSI will remain the lead agency with respect to collecting, reporting, and disseminating TALON reports to our commanders and other appropriate Air Force users, as well as to other DoD and interagency recipients. AFOSI will coordinate and promulgate an Air Force Instruction to institutionalize this process within the Department.

cc:

DL67C

From:

Sent: Friday, August 27, 2004 5:55 AM

To:

Subject: TALON & Constitutionally Protected Activities

TALON reporting was authorized by the Deputy Secretary of Defense as a means of capturing non-validated domestic threat information and incorporating it into the DoD terrorism threat warning process. The reporting categories established by Joint Staff Domestic Threat Working Group are as follows: (1) non-specific threats to DoD interests; (2) suspected surveillance of DoD facilities and personnel; (3) elicitation attempts, suspicious questioning, or other suspected intelligence collection activities focused on DoD interests; (4) tests of security; (5) unusual repetitive activity; (6) bomb threats; and (7) any other suspicious activity and incidents reasonably believed to be related to terrorist activity directed against DoD personnel, property, and activities within the United States.

USAF

b5, b6, b7C

Chapter 5

SPECIAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Section 5A—Talons

5.1. Talons. The Talon is a law enforcement report designed to report anomalies, observations that are suspicious against the steady state context, and immediate indicators of potential threats or antiterrorism concerns. Talons are comprised of raw, non-validated information that may or may not be related to an actual threat, and by their very nature, may be fragmented and incomplete. *NOTE:* Talons are not a substitute for opening a case file.

5.1.1. Talons are issued when incidents meet the criteria in Attachment 8. Talon criteria standards apply worldwide. Talon reports need not meet a high test for "checklist criteria," as much as a special agent/investigator/law enforcement "gut check" for concern.

5.1.2. It is critical that Talons answer the basic interrogatories, with any originator comments being clearly annotated. Raw Talon information must be swiftly briefed locally so appropriate action can be taken by the supported Commander to investigate, understand, and/or react to suspect incidents before this information is released outside the US Air Force at large.

5.2. Responsibilities of Units. Create an A&P file with the unit designation followed by the word "Talons," e.g. "Det 123 Talons." Associate all unit Talon activities to this file. Prepare Talon and Talon Echoes as specified in Attachment 9.

5.3. Responsibilities of HQ AFOSI/DO. The Global Watch Center (Watch), HQ AFOSI/DOOW, is responsible for processing Talon reports as specified in Attachments 9 and 10. The Talon review committee, which is comprised of personnel from HQ AFOSI/DOO, DOOP, DOOG, and DOQE, will conduct a daily review of all Talons received to ensure the proper follow-up actions are taken by the reporting detachments. The Watch, in coordination with HQ AFOSI/DOO or designee, will contact the reporting detachments and their corresponding region Talon point of contact when the Talon review committee identifies follow-up actions required for any Talon.

5.4. Responsibilities of Region Talon Points of Contact (POC). The region Talon POC will be responsible for ensuring the detachment accomplishes all required follow-up directed by the Watch.

Attachment 8

TALON REPORTABLE INCIDENTS

A8.1. Talon Reporting Criteria. The following six categories of information constitute the current USAF guidance on information that must be reported via a Talon:

A8.1.1. Specific Threats. Threats received by any means, which contain a specific time, location or area for an attack against US forces, facilities or missions. This includes, but is not limited to, any event or incident, or series of events or incidents, which in and of themselves may indicate the potential for a threat to US forces, facilities, or mission, regardless of whether the threat posed is deliberately targeted or collateral.

A8.1.2. Surveillance. Any reported possible surveillance in which an attempt to record information or to use unusual means to monitor activities is observed. Such attempts may include use of cameras (either still or video), note taking, annotated maps or drawings, hand-drawn maps or diagrams, use of binoculars or other vision enhancing devices, or any reports from host nation security forces of possible surveillance of US assets.

A8.1.3. Elicitation. Any attempts to obtain security-related or military-specific information by anyone who does not have the appropriate security clearance and the need-to-know. Elicitation attempts may be made by mail, fax, telephone, by computer, or in person.

A8.1.4. Tests Of Security. Any attempts to measure security reaction times or strengths; any attempts to test or to penetrate physical security barriers or procedures; any attempts to acquire or duplicate uniforms, badges, passes, or other security related documents.

A8.1.5. Repetitive Activities. Any activities that meet one of the other Talon criteria and have occurred two or more times: the same activity by the same person and/or vehicle, within a 1 month period.

A8.1.6. Suspicious Activities/Incidents. This category should **ONLY** be used if the Talon information **DOES NOT** meet any of the above criteria. Any activity or incident that does not specifically fit into the aforementioned five categories yet is believed to represent a force protection threat, should be reported under this category. Examples of this include: issue resulting in the scrambling of homeland defense assets; thefts of material that could be used to manufacture false identification cards; thefts of military uniforms which may be used to gain access to a military installation, etc.

A8.2. Reporting Talon Incidents. Talons are of a tactical nature, with rapid dissemination as the goal, and may be less refined than IIRs. IIRs are written with national consumers in mind and, as such, should be of the highest quality in writing style and completeness. Critical to both reports is the proper documentation of the basic interrogatories (who – ALL PEOPLE INVOLVED, what, when, where, why, and how), the source's knowledge of these, and a clear definition of facts versus opinion (source's or reporter's). Also, ensure all Talon's are appropriately edited (i.e. spell check and grammar check all Talon's PRIOR to submission). Report incidents meeting Talon criteria using the timeline as illustrated by Figure A8.1, format in Attachment 9 and instructions as follows:

A8.2.1. Notify your installation commander or designee, installation force protection working groups (IFPWG), and SF units of incidents meeting Talon criteria within **one hour** of developing the information.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

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A8.2.2. Prepare Talon reports within two hours of developing the information or if the information suggests an immediate threat, notify the Watch immediately via telephone at [redacted] and subsequently follow-up with a Talon report.


A8.2.2.1. Create a Talon activity in I2MS according to Attachment 9. Associate the activity to your unit's Talon file.

A8.2.3. If the information documented in a Talon is incorporated in an operational or case file after the initial Talon is submitted, prepare a Talon Echo (Attachment 9) referencing the file number as required and associate the Talon to the file. This will close out the Talon and all further information should be documented in the file.

A8.2.4. As a general guide and to the maximum extent possible, Talon's should be classified at the lowest possible level to ensure maximum distribution of the information. Use of the Law Enforcement Sensitive caveat and higher classifications only when the situation absolutely requires treating the information as such. If the Talon contains information that is too sensitive to be published outside of AFOSI, request the Talon be kept within AFOSI channels only and explain the reasons for this in the comments sections of the Talon.

A8.2.5. Submit follow-ups to the Watch via Talon Echo reports as information becomes available, until the Talon is closed.

Figure A8.1. Timeline for Talon Reports.



A8.3. Alternate Talon Reporting Methods. Talons augment but are not a substitute for standard AFOSI reporting mechanisms. IIRs, operational files, and case files are to be documented as directed by existing AFOSI policies and directives. Units could conceivably document activities under a Talon, an IIR and an investigation for the same matter. Squadron, Region and ICON personnel will assist field units, as required, in determining the appropriate reporting vehicle. The ICON Director or a designee will be the ultimate authority for conflict resolution. In order to facilitate rapid collections and/or investigative focus concerning threat type information or circumstances, AFOSI/CV has granted direct tasking authority to the Director, ICON (who may further delegate if required). The ICON may task field units to conduct investigative follow-up and or activities concerning Talon type information to further focus on a particular threat.

A8.3.1. Should an AFOSI detachment assess the suspect activity as immediately meriting a case file, the unit may notify the Watch with the Complaint Report using I2MS in lieu of a Talon. The Watch then will create the Talon. All Talon criteria must be contained in the Complaint Report along with the Talon sequence number or a separate Talon will be required. The **two-hour** reporting requirement still applies if a Complaint Report is submitted in lieu of a Talon. Unless otherwise directed by the Watch, observe existing AFOSI instructions for reporting and staffing the Complaint Report for follow-up investigation. The Talon will contain a reference number to any investigations opened.

A8.3.2. If the suspect activity meets a collection requirement, generate an IIR.

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A8.3.2.1. An IIR can be submitted in lieu of a Talon but must still be received at the Watch within the **two-hour** requirement. IIRs should be transmitted via Defense Messaging Service. Copies may be sent to the HQ AFOSI Watch e-mail box. An IIR may be submitted in addition to a Talon if it is supported by a collection requirement; if deemed appropriate by the reporting unit, squadron or region; or as directed by the Watch. A Talon Echo must be sent identifying the IIR and Date-Time-Group (DTG) of any IIR produced referencing information submitted in a Talon. At that time, the Talon will be closed with no further Echoes required.

A8.4. Processing Talons. Within **two hours** of receipt of the Talon, the Watch will determine if the report meets Talon criteria. If it meets Talon criteria, the Watch will import the Talon into the master database maintained by the Watch and publish the Talon to the Eagle Watch webpage. This will ensure USAF leadership has the most current threat information for situational awareness, and as necessary, upgrade installation security measures, allowing defensive forces to remain abreast of all reporting, no matter the apparent significance of the information. **NOTE:** If the Watch determines that the information should not be released outside of AFOSI (even if the submitting unit did not make the request IAW A8.2.4), the Watch Shift Leader will either redact the sensitive information from the publicly available webpage or not publish it externally.

A8.5. HQ AFOSI/DO Talon Review Process. The Watch will track Talons to ensure resolution of all incidents. The Watch will determine when incidents are resolved upon review of follow-up reports. Additional Region, HQ or ICON offices will assist as required IAW 5.6 and 5.7.

A8.5.1. **Resolved Incidents.** The Watch, squadrons, regions, and reporting units will determine whether incidents meet established collection requirements outlined in AFOSIMAN 71-144 Volume 7. Incidents not meeting IIR criteria are closed with no further action required. Field units create IIRs for incidents meeting collection requirements. The IIR then completes the reporting process. Talons resulting in operations or investigations will reflect appropriate file numbers in the final Talon submission.

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A8.5.2. **Unresolved Incidents.** The Watch will determine if a follow-up to the incident can or should be done. If no follow-up is needed, the incident is reviewed to see if it meets a collection requirement. If it does, an IIR is written within the command standard (48-hours). If it does not, the Talon is closed. Unresolved Talons will continue to draw attention by the USAF chain-of-command until resolved. The Watch will remain actively engaged in all unresolved incidents.

A8.6. Closing Talon Incidents. A Talon may be closed:

A8.6.1. By generating an IIR.

A8.6.1.1. Prepare a Talon Echo referencing the IIR number and DTG.

A8.6.1.2. Include the Talon sequence number and all information required for a Talon report (Attachment 9) in the text of the IIR.

A8.6.2. By opening an operational or case file.

A8.6.2.1. Associate the Talon activity to the case file where further information will be documented.

A8.6.2.2. Include the Talon sequence number and all information required for a Talon report (Attachment 9) in the summary of allegation.

A8.6.3. By preparing a Talon Echo when all investigative steps have been completed and the incident does not warrant additional reporting.

Attachment 9

HOW TO PREPARE TALON AND TALON ECHO REPORTS

A9.1. Talon Reports. Create Talon reports in I2MS. I2MS will automatically populate fields based on information entered in the Talon activity when you generate the Talon report. Export the Talon report to Word to edit the document.

A9.1.1. Date. I2MS automatically enters the date. Update it if necessary. **THIS IS A REQUIRED FIELD.**

A9.1.2. Sequence Number. Enter only three digits of your sequence number, e.g. 035 for your unit's thirty-fifth Talon. I2MS will properly format the Talon number. (Det number-dd-mm-yr-local sequence number, e.g. 303-18-10-01-002. This translates into, Det 303 published this Talon on 18 Oct 2001 and it was the second Talon report they published.) **THIS IS A REQUIRED FIELD.**

A9.1.3. Talon Criteria. Select the Talon criteria. Only use suspicious activity/incident when the information DOES NOT meet any of the other criteria (see Attachment 8). **THIS IS A REQUIRED FIELD.**

A9.1.4. Status. Check the "Resolved" box if the Talon is resolved with the initial report.

A9.1.5. Summary. Enter a brief summary of two to three sentences of what the Talon is about. This is not a regurgitation of the Details but a simple summary. It should not contain any specific information. **THIS IS A REQUIRED FIELD. NOTE:** The specifics should be in the detail section. This is the short summary that, along with the one line title is posted to the face of the webpage to gain the reader's attention. It must be short since the space available on the webpage is limited

A9.1.6. Source and Assessment of Credibility. Who provided the information, how credible is the source, and why do you assess the source that way? **THIS IS A REQUIRED FIELD. NOTE:** "OneTime Sources" must already be entered as participants in I2MS. "OSI Sources" must have an I2MS source file.

A9.1.7. Actions Taken and Pending. Briefly describe all completed and planned investigative steps taken to bring the incident to closure (running license plate checks, interview another witness, etc.). **THIS IS A REQUIRED FIELD.**

EXAMPLE

Unknown individual observed taking photographs of front gate of Andrews AFB. When approached, he left and a license plate was recorded. The license plate was identified as being invalid so no further information could be obtained.

A9.1.8. Persons Involved. Create participant objects for all persons involved and associate them to the activity. This includes everyone who was briefed locally, and subjects, witnesses and incidentals. Obtain all possible identification details of suspects. **THIS IS A REQUIRED FIELD.**

A9.1.9. Title. Enter the word "Talon" followed by the Talon Sequence Number, e.g. Talon CO-28-08-02-001.

A9.1.10. Narrative. Fully document the details: Who, What, When, Where, Why, and How. This is the most critical part of the report for the reader. Obtain all possible identification details of the suspected incident for further follow-up (including license plates). Be specific about what source said. Also be specific about what source did not know (avoid second-guessing by higher echelons). Use memory tools to aid source in remembering details (mild interrogation). For example, one tool all Army personnel are trained in, down to the troop level, is SALUTE: Size (size of suspicious

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element, e.g. "two people"); Activity (what was going on, e.g. "drove by guard gate slowly"); Location (where did it happen, e.g. "guard post 3"); Unit (identification of unit involved, e.g. "local contractor hired TCN"); Time (when did it happen, e.g. "20:00 hours, 2 January 2002"); Equipment (what were they carrying, driving, etc., e.g. "in 1990 white Caprice, with binoculars, writing notes on an aviator knee pad"). THIS IS A REQUIRED FIELD.

A9.1.11. Countries. Associate the Talon activity to the appropriate country GEO file. THIS IS A REQUIRED ACTION.

A9.1.12. Notes. Enter any comments or information that the reporting unit wants to convey but does not want included in the web-based version (internal comments similar to an IDP note) in the Notes tab.

A9.2. Talon Echo Reports. Prepare Talon Echo reports in I2MS using the original Talon activity. Enter a "Follow-up Suffix" beginning with the the letter "A" for the first update, "B" for the second update, etc.

A9.2.1. Source and Assessment of Credibility. Add any new sources. See A9.1.6.

A9.2.2. Actions Taken and Pending. Add any new actions. See A9.1.7.

A9.2.3. Persons Involved. Add any new participants. See A9.1.8.

A9.2.4. Notes. Add "Talon Follow-Up Note" to detail the results of efforts completed to resolve the Talon report or a reference to the associated file if the Talon report is not resolved.

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(b)(5)		(b)(9)	(k)(3)
(b)(6)			(k)(4)
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A Commander's Guide to AFOSI

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AFOSIPAM 71-133

1 November 2002

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Chapter 7
SPECIAL TOPICS

commanders and the DoD law enforcement community, AFOSI also created the Eagle Watch web page on the

to allow all personnel with access to view TALON information as it is received.

The Watch established a new reporting system to secure information needed to enhance threat analysis efforts--the "TALON" report. A TALON report consists of raw information that does not meet standards set forth in DoD Intelligence Collection Requirements but poses too many questions to dismiss.

A significant part of the Watch's mission is to coordinate terrorist threat information developed by the Air Force with other national-level law enforcement, counterintelligence and intelligence counterparts. Other antiterrorist agencies use the Watch as a 24/7 lifeline for Air Force threat information. The TALONs are available to security forces, who are encouraged to review them for current intelligence and law enforcement information at each installation and for information on current threats and incidents throughout DoD.

The Watch Center provides proactive collection, reporting, and prompt dissemination within the Air Force of potential threat information, indicators, and threat warnings. In order to reach the widest dissemination of information to Air Force

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<input type="checkbox"/>	(b)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	(j)(2)
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<input type="checkbox"/>	(b)(7)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/>	(k)(6)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(b)(7)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/>	(k)(7)

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AFOSI INSTRUCTION 35-101

3 MARCH 2003

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13.5. Eagle Eyes vs. Talon Categories. Similarities exist between Eagle Eyes categories and Talon Report categories, although they are not the same, and AFOSI personnel should not confuse the two. The differences are attributable to the fact that the programs' audiences and purposes are different.

13.5.2. A Talon Report, on the other hand, is a law-enforcement report. Talons have their own classification categories that suit the recipients of those reports – namely, other law-enforcement personnel, intelligence personnel, and certain others already schooled in the basics of terrorism planning.