

# CPP-NPA-NDF PARTY LIST OPERATIONS FOR 2004 ELECTIONS



# PRESENTATION OUTLINE

## **PART I – PARTY LIST ELECTION BY THE NUMBER**

- I. Mechanism for Party List Elections (RA 7931)
- II. Comparative Figures of the 1998 and 2001 Elections
- III. 2004 Election Projections
- IV. Initial Assessment of Election Data
- V. Significance of Election Data

## **PART II – THE CPP-NPA-NDF ELECTION STRATEGY**

- I. The BM in 2001 Elections
- II. Givens in the CPP-NPA-NDF Current Party List Operations
- III. Current Strategy of the CPP-NPA-NDF in Support of the Party List Operations
- IV. Where and How to Get the Votes

# PRESENTATION OUTLINE

## **PART III– IMPLICATIONS OF CPP ELECTORAL VICTORY IN 2004**

- I. Social
- II. Political
- III. Financial
- IV. Military
- V. Economic

## **PART IV – MECHANICS OF OPERATION**

- I. Concept Of Operations
- II. Mobilization

# I. MECHANISM FOR PARTY LIST ELECTIONS

- Partylist shall constitute 20 percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives
- Currently, there are 45 seats allocated for the partylist.
- Any partylist group who will get at least 2 percent of the total votes cast for the partylist will get one seat
- A maximum of 3 seats per partylist group is allowed
- Similar entitlements (salaries and emoluments) as regular member of the HOR

## II. COMPARATIVE FIGURES OF 1998 AND 2001 PARTY LIST ELECTIONS

### Total Registered Voters (TRV)

1998	34,163,465
2001	36,549,317


### Total Votes Cast (TVC)

1998	27,330,772	80% TURNOUT
2001	32,528,892	89% TURNOUT

### Party List Votes (PLV)

1998	9,155,309	33.5% OF TVC
2001	14,828,445	45.6% OF TVC

## II. COMPARATIVE FIGURES OF 1998 AND 2001 PARTY LIST ELECTIONS



PART I – PARTY LIST ELECTION BY THE NUMBER

## III. ELECTION 2004 PROJECTIONS

- The total registered voters (TRV) for 2004 is placed at **39.6M** without the absentee votes.
- TRV may reach **43.6 M** if the absentee voting will be added
- The total votes cast (TVC) is estimated at **33.5 M** without the absentee voting and **36.88 M** with the absentee voting<sup>[1]</sup>

[1] CPP-NPA-NDF estimate per the BM National Consultation Meeting for 2004 Elections, March 15-16, 2003

## IV. INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF ELECTION DATA

- The 9 percent increase in the voters turnout from 80 percent in 1998 to 89 percent in 2001 produced 12.1 percent increase in PLV
- The resulting PLV for 2004 could be 18,881,945 without the absentee voting and 19,290,925 with absentee voting.




## V. SIGNIFICANCE OF PLV DATA

- This will increase the 2 percent vote requirement between **377,638** to **385,818**<sup>[1]</sup>
- The possible increase in the value of the 2 percent requirement will not significantly affect BM because of its excess votes in 2001
- Other party list groups have to campaign harder in order to reach the required 2 percent



<sup>[1]</sup> BM has a rather lower estimate which is between 346,000-380,000 per seat

# I. THE BAYAN MUNA IN 2001 ELECTIONS

- BM participated in 2001 elections for two reasons:
  - to open up a parliamentary venue for alliance and united front building,
  - to ultimately destroy the government using its own resources and legitimate institutions.
- With 1.7 million votes in 2001 representing 11.6 percent of the total partylist votes, BM realized that it could put more representatives in Congress.



Number of Votes



REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF 2001 BAYAN MUNA VOTES

## High Voters Turnout Resulted to High Party-List Votes\*

Province/City**	Total Votes Cast (TVC)	Registered Voters	Voters Turnout	Total Party List Votes (TPLV)	TPLV/ TVC
AGUSAN DEL NORTE	217,459	217,787	99.85%	100,059	46.01%
ALBAY	429,520	514,584	83.47%	184,832	43.03%
SURIGAO DEL NORTE	224,296	269,145	83.34%	116,186	51.80%
KALINGA	69,158	83,956	82.37%	38,107	55.10%
EASTERN SAMAR	157,370	192,149	81.90%	68,662	43.63%
IFUGAO	63,113	77,079	81.88%	37,853	59.98%
SORSOGON	248,390	303,763	81.77%	121,565	48.94%
MT. PROVINCE	56,726	69,460	81.67%	32,756	57.74%
NORTHERN SAMAR	195,522	240,587	81.27%	94,694	48.43%
MASBATE	260,301	324,935	80.11%	188,289	72.33%
CAMARINES SUR	521,243	654,330	79.85%	263,940	50.64%
SURIGAO DEL SUR	205,287	259,192	79.66%	80,757	39.34%
AURORA	63,837	80,801	79.20%	35,480	55.58%
TARLAC	388,453	492,727	79.01%	190,022	48.92%
DAVAO ORIENTAL	165,233	211,261	78.84%	74,736	45.23%
OCCIDENTAL MINDORO	125,856	161,853	78.21%	70,558	56.06%
CAMARINES NORTE	151,505	197,229	77.76%	82,474	54.44%
AGUSAN DEL SUR	191,180	249,857	76.82%	84,477	44.20%
SAMAR	269,084	355,175	76.52%	117,254	43.58%
COMPOSTELA VALLEY	195,653	263,624	75.76%	85,946	43.93%

## BM was Able to Capitalize on the Resulting High Party-List Votes\*

Province/City**	Bayan Muna Votes (BMV)	Total Party List Votes (TPLV)	BMV/TPLV
SURIGAO DEL SUR	39,182	80,757	48.52%
SORSOGON	51,537	121,565	42.39%
NORTHERN SAMAR	39,352	94,694	41.56%
ALBAY	64,832	184,832	35.08%
SAMAR	40,748	117,254	34.75%
AGUSAN DEL SUR	28,040	84,477	33.19%
COMPOSTELA VALLEY	27,744	85,946	32.28%
KALINGA	11,482	38,107	30.13%
SURIGAO DEL NORTE	32,167	116,186	27.69%
CAMARINES SUR	71,222	263,940	26.98%
AGUSAN DEL NORTE	24,132	100,059	24.12%
MASBATE	43,288	188,289	22.99%
MT. PROVINCE	7,327	32,756	22.37%
EASTERN SAMAR	15,326	68,662	22.32%
OCCIDENTAL MINDORO	14,469	70,558	20.51%
DAVAO ORIENTAL	15,254	74,736	20.41%
AURORA	7,025	35,480	19.80%
CAMARINES NORTE	16,200	82,474	19.64%
TARLAC	35,548	190,022	18.71%
IFUGAO	7,039	37,853	18.60%

## Areas with High Voters Turnout Delivered the Votes for BM

Province/City*	Bayan Muna Votes** (BMV)	Total Votes Cast (TVC)	Percentage
SORSOGON	51,537	248,390	20.75%
NORTHERN SAMAR	39,352	195,522	20.13%
SURIGAO DEL SUR	39,182	205,287	19.10%
MASBATE	43,288	260,301	16.63%
KALINGA	11,482	69,158	16.60%
ALBAY	64,832	429,520	15.10%
SAMAR	40,748	269,084	15.14%
AGUSAN DEL SUR	28,040	191,180	14.67%
SURIGAO DEL NORTE	32,167	224,296	14.34%
COMPOSTELLA VALLEY	27,744	195,653	14.18%
CAMARINES SUR	71,222	521,243	13.67%
MT. PROVINCE	7,327	56,726	12.92%
IFUGAO	7,039	63,113	11.15%
OCCIDENTAL MINDORO	14,469	125,856	11.50%
AGUSAN DEL NORTE	24,132	217,459	11.10%
AURORA	7,025	63,837	11.00%
CAMARINES NORTE	16,200	151,505	10.70%
EASTERN SAMAR	15,326	157,370	9.74%
DAVAO ORIENTAL	15,254	165,233	9.23%
TARLAC	35,548	388,453	9.15%

## Areas with High Level of Insurgency and LCM Movements Delivered High Votes to BM\*

Province/City**	Bayan Muna Vote (BMV)	Influenced Barangays	Infiltrated Barangays	Threatened Barangays
CAMARINES SUR	71,222	12	28	No data
ALBAY	64,832	2	10	No data
SORSOGON	51,537	No data	19	No data
MASBATE	43,288	21	49	No data
SAMAR	40,748	No data	No data	No data
NORTHERN SAMAR	39,352	15	23	No data
SURIGAO DEL SUR	39,182	4		No data
TARLAC	35,548	1	7	No data
SURIGAO DEL NORTE	32,167	3	1	No data
AGUSAN DEL SUR	28,040	5	13	No data
COMPOSTELA VALLEY	27,744	4	6	No data
AGUSAN DEL NORTE	24,132	No data	5	No data
CAMARINES NORTE	16,200	12	30	No data
EASTERN SAMAR	15,326	14	25	No data
DAVAO ORIENTAL	15,254	4	8	20
OCCIDENTAL MINDORO	14,469	6	22	No data
KALINGA	11,482	No data	2	No data
MT. PROVINCE	7,327	No data	6	No data
IFUGAO	7,039	No data	No data	No data
AURORA	7,025	No data	52	No data

# I. THE BAYAN MUNA IN 2001 ELECTIONS

- The victory of Bayan Muna last 2001 elections signified a major breakthrough in the advancement of its political and parliamentary struggle.
- BM insisted that it is correct in its observation that the political condition is ripe for the advancement of the participation of the Left in mainstream political processes.



## II. GIVEN IN THE CPP-NPA-NDF PARTY LIST OPNS

- CPP aims to grab 9 seats at the minimum
- Divided BM into five partylist groups:
  - Bayan Muna for general membership
  - Anakpawis for peasant, labor and urban poor
  - Anakbayan for youth and students
  - Gabriela for women
  - Migrante for OFW
  - Suara Bangsamoro
- Distributed the leadership with Satur Ocampo, Crispin Beltran and Liza Maza heading BM, Anakpawis and Gabriela respectively

## II. GIVEN IN THE CPP-NPA-NDF PARTY LIST OPNS

- Migrante will represent a new voting bloc of OFW per the Absentee Voting Law
- Anakbayan is a test case for the strength of youth and student bloc and is designed to fail in the elections.

### III. CURRENT STRATEGY OF THE CPP-NPA-NDF IN SUPPORT OF THE PARTY LIST OPNS

- The CPP directed the redeployment of all regional cadres who are experts in organizing work to the municipal and provincial levels
- Said cadres are tasked to ensure the delivery of “negotiated votes”
- The CCP/NPA/NDF party list organizations targets the grassroots organizations to generate votes.

### III. CURRENT STRATEGY OF THE CPP-NPA-NDF IN SUPPORT OF THE PARTY LIST OPNS

- Underground Mass Organizations (UGMO) like the Organizing Committees and Party Branches are presently integrated and camouflaged in the local chapters of the party list organizations for campaign purposes.
- The CPP/NPA/NDF will do all means necessary to generate the required votes to attain their projected electoral seats in congress.

# IV. WHERE AND HOW TO GET THE VOTES

## A. VOTING ESTIMATES

- The CPP estimates that the 2% partylist vote (PLV) for every seat may vary between 346,000 to 380,000

- 3-2-2 Formula

3 for BM	-	1,050,000 votes
2 for Anakpawis	-	700,000 votes
2 for Gabriela	-	700,000 votes

## IV. WHERE AND HOW TO GET THE VOTES


- Migrante could also deliver an additional of 1 seat but the priority in terms of sharing votes goes to BM, Anakpawis and Gabriela
- The lowest share in partylist votes the CPP-NPA-NDF hopes to get for 2004 is **2.6 million** while the highest estimate would be **2.9 million**

# IV. WHERE AND HOW TO GET THE VOTES

## B. REGIONAL ALLOCATIONS

Region	2001 votes	2004 Votes (Low)	2004 Votes (High)
SMR	114,610	200,000	240,000
FSMR	47,350	104,000	104,000
NEMR	123,531	123,531	123,531
WMR	43,681	120,000	120,000
NCMR	37,936	41,000	45,000
NEGROS	61,074	101,000	101,000
PANAY	79,926	100,000	100,000
CENVIS	39,576	100,000	278,940
CAGVAL	25,870	50,000	50,000
ICR	61,359	67,444	67,444
CL	240,063	340,063	340,063
BICOL	252,290	353,206	353,206
ST	234,002	351,003	351,003
NCR	218,435	436,870	436,870
EVIZ	132,358	132,358	198,537
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,712,061</b>	<b>2,620,475</b>	<b>2,909,594</b>

# 2004 VOTE PROJECTION/REGION (LOW)



Negros - Low 2004

101000

Panay - Low 2004

100000

Regions - Low 2004

41000

41000 - 50000

50000 - 67444

67444 - 104000

104000 - 123531

123531 - 132358


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


353206 - 436870

No Data





# 2004 VOTE PROJECTION/REGION (HIGH)



## IV. WHERE AND HOW TO GET THE VOTES

- Based on the total, the CPP-NPA-NDF would produce:
  - 53 percent increase on its 2001 performance of 1,712,061 to reach the minimum number of 2004 votes of 2,620,475 (low projection)
  - 70 percent increase to reach the maximum votes of 2,909,594 (high projection).




# IV. WHERE AND HOW TO GET THE VOTES

## C. MUNICIPAL ALLOCATIONS IN STRONGHOLD AREAS

- BM topped in **305 cities and municipalities** nationwide last 2001 elections.
- These 305 municipalities alone delivered close to **700,000 votes** enough to put in two representatives.
- If the 50-70 percent projection will be considered, these 305 municipalities are expected to generate **1,050,000 to 1,190,000** votes enough for 4 partylist representatives.

# Bayan Muna Stronghold Municipalities

## Municipal Votes



## SUMMARY OF STRONGHOLD MUNICIPALITIES PER PROVINCE

PROVINCE	MUNICIPALITIES
ABRA	5
AGUSAN DEL NORTE	5
AGUSAN DEL SUR	14
AKLAN	1
ALBAY	16
ANTIQUE	1
AURORA	3
BATANGAS	1
BENGUET	2
BOHOL	7
BUKIDNON	7
BULACAN	3
CAGAYAN	1
CAMARINES NORTE	5
CAMARINES SUR	21
CAPIZ	5
CATANDUANES	2
CAVITE	1

## SUMMARY OF STRONGHOLD MUNICIPALITIES PER PROVINCE

COPOSTELA VALLEY	8
NORTH COTABATO	6
DAVAO DEL NORTE	3
DAVAO DEL SUR	1
DAVAO ORIENTAL	6
EASTERN SAMAR	11
IFUGAO	3
ILOCOS SUR	8
ILOILO	7
ISABELA	1
KALINGA	4
LAGUNA	3
LEYTE	2
MARINDUQUE	1
MASBATE	11
MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL	2
MOUNTAIN PROVINCE	3
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL	3
NORTHERN SAMAR	16

## SUMMARY OF STRONGHOLD MUNICIPALITIES PER PROVINCE

NUEVA ECIJA	9
NUEVA VIZCAYA	3
OCCIDENTAL MINDORO	6
ORIENTAL MINDORO	6
PAMPANGA	6
PANGASINAN	1
QUEZON	9
SAMAR (WESTERN SAMAR)	13
SARANGANI	3
SORSOGON	14
SOUTH COTABATO	4
SURIGAO DEL NORTE	11
SURIGAO DEL SUR	12
TARLAC	4
ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE	2
ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR	2


# IV. WHERE AND HOW TO GET THE VOTES

## D. BARANGAY OPERATIONS

- In 2001, BM employed a barangay operating structure that is both an electoral team and organizing machinery down to the precinct level.
- This structure later served in the 2002 Barangay elections wherein BM fielded more or less 510 candidates in different elective barangay positions nationwide



# BM BARANGAY OPERATING STRUCTURE



# I. SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS

- Completion of the third leg of the triangular national democratic struggle.
- Further heightening of the polarization of the elite and the masses, labor and employer, and the peasants and landlords
- Decisively and rapidly cause a crack in the relations between the military, government and society

## II. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

- Winning a nine electoral seat held by the CPP can mean a lot of political headache and problems
- 9 representatives can be a very strong and solid opposition bloc
- Legitimate access by the CPP/NPA/NDF to government programs, information and activities under the cloak of power to make legislative inquiry
- Directly engage the legitimate government institutions owing to the latter's legal nature as a political entity.

## II. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

- It can legitimize claim for political constituency and ratify its claim of two governments existing in the Philippines
- They can dictate the outcome of the election at the local level
- Continuously antagonize the executive department
- Facilitate and fast-track the infiltration of the legislature by the CPP-NPA-NDF
- It can decisively lobby for the removal of the terrorist tag to Joma Sison and the NPA

## III. FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

- Opening of legal channels of funding support for the CPP/NPA/NDF for organizing and mass-building efforts from local and international sources
- Access to at least 450 Million pesos (50 million per seat x 9 representatives) in pork barrel funds

## IV. MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

- Delay of passing of defense budget for military and police not to mention difficulty in confirmation of military officers for promotion in the CA
- Heightening human rights issues against military and police personnel to deter/ limit the extent of military operations
- Heighten popular agitation against the government and polarization of police, military and society through destructive legislative work

## V. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS

- CPP-NPA-NDF party list groups can cause deliberate failure of government programs and projects
- Portray the Congress as a pro-capitalist and anti-people government institution and at the same time justifying their continued stay in Congress by deceiving the people that they are there to protect the interest of the masses.
- Can cause lack of confidence in Congress from business groups and investors due to expected and usual partylist opposition to economic policies of the government

# I. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

Make it hard for CPP-NPA-NDF party list groups to campaign and make it easy for party list allies to campaign



# I. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

## A. For Stronghold Areas

- Focus denial operation on 305 identified stronghold municipalities/cities
- Divide potential votes by allowing other partylist groups to penetrate the area
- Limiting the coercive power of the NPA during elections through successive and sustained military and police operations

# I. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

- Isolating politicians identified with the Left to prevent them from delivering the negotiated votes
- Limiting the movement of its barangay operating structure
- Special operation against campaign propaganda/materials
- Aggressive intelligence and counterintelligence operations to neutralize white area infrastructures
- Extensive and aggressive SOT

# I. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

## B. Massive Information Operations in Trench Warfare Areas

- Divide the vote
- Massive recruitment
- SOT and massive information operations

# I. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

## C. For areas where partylist allies are strong

- Consolidate electoral forces and expand
- Firm up hold over initiative and political clout
- Prevent them from campaigning

## II. MOBILIZATION

### A. Massive Information Campaign

- The military and the police should facilitate the dissemination of information and tasks to field units
- Political parties, candidates and allied partylist groups should be given proper information how to handle the issue.
- Voters and other stakeholders

## II. MOBILIZATION

### B. Recommended Tasks

#### **Police**

- Secure warrant of arrests for cadres attached to local candidates
- Prevent candidates supportive of the CPP/NPA/NDF from campaigning in areas controlled by the PNP.
- Conduct monitoring of local candidates supportive of the CPP/NPA/NDF
- Denounce, expose and file charges against local candidates collaborating with the CPP/NPA/NDF

## II. MOBILIZATION

### Military

- Conduct tactical operations to prevent local candidates and CPP/NPA/NDF party list groups from campaigning.
- Conduct SOT and house to house information campaign.
- Isolate and deter their coordinators of local candidates and the party list groups from campaigning.
- Implement TIE programs for the troops on the ground

## II. MOBILIZATION

### OTHER RELEVANT AGENCIES

- Conduct information campaign in the barangays.
- Warn and expose local candidates supportive of the CPP/NPA/NDF
- Promote other party list organization to marginalize the CCP/NPA/NDF party list groups.
- File disqualification cases against CPP partylist groups



## II. MOBILIZATION

### OTHER RELEVANT AGENCIES

Promote other party list organization to marginalize the CCP/NPA/NDF party list groups.

- ABA-AKO
- COOP-NATCO
- AKAPIN
- ABANSE PINAY
- AKBAYAN
- TUCP
- OTHERS

## II. MOBILIZATION

### d. Mobilization Activities

#### 1. Nationwide Briefing

Major services

Area Commands

PNP Regional and provincial Offices

Division, Brigades and Battalion

Triad Group

CRS and PCRG

Intel groups

#### 2. Mobilization of reservists and other allies

**END OF PRESENTATION**